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Performance-based Financing in the Context of Selective Free Health-Care: 
an evaluation of its effects on the use of primary health care services in Burundi 
using routine data 
 
Jean-Benoît Falisse, Juvenal Ndayishimiye, Vincent Kamenyero, Michel Bossuyt1 
 
Performance-based financing (PBF) is an increasingly adopted strategy in low and middle-income countries. PBF 
pilot projects started in Burundi in 2006, at the same time when a national policy removed user fees for pregnant 
woman and children below 5 years. PBF was gradually extended to the 17 provinces of 15 the country. This roll-
out and data from the national health information system are exploited to assess the impact of PBF on the use of 
health-care services. Despite the limited quality of the data and the restricted size of the sample, an effect of PBF is 
found on the number of anti-tetanus vaccination of pregnant women (20.3 percentage points in target population). 
Non-robust effects are 20 also found on institutional deliveries and prenatal consultations. Changes in outpatient 
visits, postnatal visits and children vaccinations are not correlated with PBF. It is also found that more qualified 
nurses headed to PBF-supported provinces. Health facility-level figures from PBF-supported provinces show that 
most indicators but those on preventive care are growing through time. The dataset does not include indicators of the 
quality of care and does not allow to assess whether the impact of PBF is resource-driven or due to the incentive 
mechanism. The results are largely consistent with other impact evaluations conducted in Burundi and Rwanda. 
The fact that the impact of PBF is mostly visible on services that became free suggests an important interaction effect 
between the two strategies. A possible explanation is that the removal of user fees increases accessibility to health 
care and acts on the demand side while PBF gives medical staffs incentives for improving the provision of services. 
More empirical research is needed to understand the sustainability of (the incentive mechanism) PBF and the 
interaction between PBF and other health policies. 
 
keywords: Burundi, evidence-based policy, exemption mechanisms, health-care reform, health 
facilities, health financing, health information system, health systems, policy evaluation, primary 
health care 
 
Performance-based Financing (PBF) is currently being implemented, under different names and versions 
(‘Result-based Financing’, ‘Pay for Performance’, etc.), in 32 low-and middle income countries (Fritsche et 
al., 2014). Yet, the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of this approach has remained mostly 
theoretical or based on early observations. Few thorough impact evaluations are available and reviews of 
                                                                
1 We are grateful to Maria Paola Bertone and Nastassia Leszczynska for commenting on earlier versions of this article 
and would like to thank the Ministry of Health of Burundi for its cooperation, especially for retrieving historical data 
from the Health Information System. 
The authors were working on different Cordaid-related projects at the moment of the research. 
JBF conducted most of the data analysis and drafted the article; VK contributed to the data analysis; MB and JN edited 
the draft version and wrote parts of the background and discussion sections. All authors read and approved the 
manuscript. 
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the literature (Witter and Fretheim, 2012; Gorter et al., 2013) have all pointed out to the fact that more 
empirical research is crucial to elevate the debate beyond issues of implementation and the expected benefits 
and drawbacks of PBF. In these respects, Burundi constitutes an interesting case study. PBF started there 
in 2006 (Busogoro and Beith, 2010; Basenya et al., 2011), at the same time when user fees were abolished 
for pregnant women and children under five (Nimpagaritse and Bertone, 2011), and the impact of the 
experience has just started being documented. The only impact evaluation available (Bonfrer et al., 2013) 
uses a sample of health centres and households located in eight provinces at three points of time (2006, 
2008, and 2010), while this study looks at province-level data in the entire country and during the entire 
pilot phase of PBF (five years).  
The present research takes advantage of the quasi-experimental situation created by the roll-out 
implementation of PBF across the 17 provinces of Burundi between 2006 and 2010. Existing secondary 
data are limited but nevertheless allow for examining the trends of key indicators over the years when PBF 
was piloted in Burundi (2006-2009). In order to explore the mechanisms through which PBF may impact 
the use of services (Macq and Chiem, 2007; Eldridge and Palmer, 2009), the article also examines the 
hypotheses that PBF attracts medical staff to the health facilities where it is implemented and reinforces 
peripheral health facilities.  
The first part of the article outlines the context of PBF in Burundi and lays out the mechanisms and 
expectations behind PBF projects. We then present the methodology and results and discuss the reasons 
why PBF -in the context of selective free health-care- seems to have a positive impact on the use of some 
services but not others. 
1. Background: PBF in Burundi 
In June 2004, the Burundi Ministry of Health (MoH) organized a general meeting on health (the Etats 
Généraux de la Santé) in Bujumbura. It was a unique occasion for the ministry and its partners to discuss the 
problems of the health sector and propose strategies that should help the country, one of the poorest in 
the world and just emerging out of a long civil war, to improve its health-care services. The need for an 
‘evaluation of the performance’ of the health system was a key recommendation of the workshop 
(Ministry of Health of Burundi, 2006a). It was coming against a challenging background: the chronic 
underfunding of the health system, coupled with a significant health workforce deficit, had resulted in a 
significant deterioration in the quality of care (Republic of Burundi, 2010). Burundi’s health system 
situation was one of the most preoccupying in the world; in 2004, the total health expenditure was US$ 16 
per capita and there was an estimate of 0.03 physicians per 1000 inhabitants (World Bank, 2004).  
In 2006, PBF pilot projects began in three provinces (Bubanza, Cankuzo and Gitega). Before those 
projects, state and international aid support to health facilities had been solely based on inputs; it usually 
included the rehabilitation and construction of buildings, the purchase of new equipment and drugs, and 
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the payment of salaries and bonuses. Yet, the use and quality of health services remained very low 
(Government of Burundi 2006; Burundi Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005). Two partners of the 
MoH, the Dutch NGOs Cordaid and HealthNet TPO (supported by the Dutch government and later the 
European Union) then proposed to move from an input-based to an output-based financial support of the 
health facilities. Their inspiration was reportedly coming from the 1993 World Bank report ‘Investing in 
Health’, the agenda of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which insisted on concrete results and 
more transparency, and the PBF experience in neighbouring Rwanda that was then described as 
“encouraging” (Soeters et al., 2006; Meessen et al., 2007). Although some have since raised the possibility 
of negative side-effects (Kalk et al., 2010; Kalk, 2011), the experience of Rwanda would later become a 
model for PBF projects (Rusa et al., 2009). 
The PBF approach in Burundi is similar to other PBF experiences (Canavan et al., 2008); its core 
mechanism consists in establishing results- (or ‘output-’ or ‘performance-’) based contracts with health 
facilities. Through these contracts, the implementing agency (i.e. an NGO or the MoH) pays subsidies for 
the amount of services delivered by the health facility. Every time a health facility delivers a contracted 
service, it is eligible for a unit subsidy that can be assigned to different uses: (1) health facility day-to-day 
operations (drug purchase, cleaning materials, etc.), (2) small investments in equipment and facilities to 
improve the quality of care, and (3) financial motivation of health workers, traditional birth attendants or 
community health workers. The services that are part of the contract are determined in advance and 
encompass most of the activities of the minimum package of activities of a health facility as defined by the 
MoH (table 1). Contracted services may vary and have varied over time, according to the implementing 
agency and the priorities of the MoH. Throughout the years, more than half of the contracted indicators at 
the health centre-level have been services for which users are not required to pay any fee. The integration 
of PBF in the free health care policy has been described as potentially contributing to the strengthening of 
the health system (Meessen et al., 2011). With the introduction of PBF, a new set of procedures for 
monitoring and verification (e.g. counter-verification of results by a third-party agency) has also been 
implemented to ensure that the services provided are of good quality, that health providers do not ‘game’ 
by declaring fabricated services, and that the different functions within the health system are clearly 
separated (Cordaid – SINA, 2009).  
  
4 
 
Table 1: key indicators at the minimum package of activities level (health centre-level)* 
curative services  reproductive health  preventive health  HIV/AIDS 
outpatient visits (n)  Deliveries  ATV pregnant mothers  HIV/AIDS testing 
supplementation in 
vitamin A  
 post-natal 
consultation 
 distribution of  
mosquito nets 
 HIV/AIDS testing for 
pregnant women 
hospitalisation 
(days) 
 ante-natal 
consultation 
 construction of latrines  patients under ARVs 
small surgery  use of intra-uterine  sensitization on malnutrition  PMTCT support 
references to 
hospital 
 device (IUD)family 
planning  
 vaccination of children 
(polio, BCG, MMR and 
DPT) 
 follow-up of HIV+ 
pregnant women 
* This is only a sample of key indicators. At least 42 different indicators have been used at this level by the different 
partners implementing PBF projects. 
 
The underlying assumptions of the PBF strategy are that it would increase the coverage of services, raise 
their quality, and strengthen health facilities (Ministry of Health of Burundi, 2006b). These would be 
achieved through three main mechanisms: (1) the payment of performance-based premium to health staff 
would constitute an extra extrinsic motivation for health care providers who then, following their own 
interests, would seek the increase of the quantity and quality of the services provided (Soeters and Vroeg, 
2011); (2) the introduction of performance contracts and mandatory (previously quarterly, now bi-annual) 
PBF development plans at the health facility-level would improve planning and management (Soeters et al., 
2006); and (3) the (re-)definition of each actor’s role in the PBF would lead to a clearer separation of the 
different functions and improve the overall functioning of the health system (Bertone and Meessen, 2012).  
PBF has taken a growingly important place in the Burundi health system. It was prefigured in the 2006-
2010 National Health Development Plan (PNDS) and a national policy for contracting health facilities 
(polique nationale de contractualisation) was developed by the MoH and validated by the Council of Ministers in 
2006. The aim of this policy was to develop the use of contracting mechanisms within the health system 
and harmonize practices. In April 2010, PBF became a nationwide policy and the PBF approach was 
scaled up to the whole country (table 2). The scaling-up followed a series of discussions between the 
donors (notably the European Union and the World Bank), the partners that had been implementing PBF 
pilot projects, and the government. Most inside the Ministry of Health viewed PBF favourably and key 
donors favoured the approach. At that point of time, no sound impact evaluation of PBF in Burundi was 
available, although the experience was being depicted positively on the basis of anecdotal evidence and 
stories of a largely smooth implementation (Toonen et al., 2009; Busogoro and Beith, 2010; Ministry of 
Health of Burundi, 2010). The functioning and procedures of PBF were defined in guidelines elaborated 
by the MoH and its different partners. They have regularly re-examined the choice of indicators.  
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Table 2: rolling-out of PBF 
Province Organisation Date of launch 
Bubanza Cordaid 2006 
Cankuzo Cordaid / European Union 2006 
Gitega HealthNet TPO 2006 
Bururi Cordaid 2008 (district of Rumonge), 2009 
Makamba Cordaid / European Union 2008 (district of Nyanza-Lac), 2009 
Karuzi Cordaid / European Union 2009 
Rutana Cordaid / European Union 2009 
Ruyigi Cordaid / European Union 2009 
Ngozi Swiss TPH 2009 
Kirundo Belgian Technical Cooperation 2009 
Rest of the country (set of a new 
national-level PBF system) 
Ministry of Health April 2010 
 
2. Data and Methods 
The rollout of PBF (see Table 1) creates the conditions for a quasi-experiment. We exploit it, in line with 
what Basinga et al. (2011) did for Rwanda, to study the evolution of different services across provinces 
and time accounting for the presence of PBF projects.  
The main problem with assessing the impact of PBF on the use of health services and the health of the 
population in Burundi is the paucity of data. It is caused by both the logic of NGO and other partners’ 
interventions and the structural weakness of the Burundian health information system. PBF projects 
mostly cared about their internal consistency, which is whether the activities are proceeding as planned 
and the beneficiaries seem satisfied with them. As a consequence, data were only collected in the area of 
implementation, making it very difficult to disentangle a PBF effect from other confounding factors and 
interaction variables (Khandker and Koolwal, 2010). This problem can be partially circumvented using 
data that have been collected routinely nationwide by the Burundi National Health Information System 
(NHIS). However, because of the very limited capacities of the Burundi NHIS, this collection may not 
have been of prime quality. It only happened for a limited number of variables and usable data are only 
available at the province-level. This limits the scope of the impact evaluation but does not prevent it. 
We choose to mainly focus on activities (1) whose NHIS series are the most complete, (2) which are the 
core business of health facilities, and (3) which are mainly indicators contracted under the PBF schemes. 
Consequently, the impact indicators that were retained are: the number of (1) visits (outpatient), (2) ante-
natal visits (no data for 2006), (3) delivery at the health facility, (4) vaccinations of children (Polio; 
tuberculosis (Bacillus Calmette–Guérin, BCG); Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus (DPT); and Measles, 
Mumps and Rubella (MMR)), and (5) fittings of intra-uterine devices (IUD) as a family planning method. 
Two important primary health care services that were not contracted under PBF (prior to 2010) were also 
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included, post-natal visits and treatment of malaria, in order to see whether PBF produces a side effect on 
non-contracted services.  Finally, we also considered the ratio of stillbirths and perinatal deaths (within 7 
days of delivery) relative to the number of institutional deliveries. No indicator for HIV/AIDS-related 
data were available2 and data about specific hospital-based activities (the ‘complementary package of 
activities’) were too sparse to be used, hence our focus on primary health-care services. 
Only three series that contain important gaps (especially for the year 2006) are potentially usable as control 
variables: (1) the number of qualified medical staff (nurses), (2) the number of public health facilities, and 
(3) the number of private health facilities, which is also a proxy for the wealth of the province. They are 
expressed per 10,000 inhabitants. The registered public health expenditures per province were also initially 
considered but the series was crippled with numerous missing observations and the accounting approach 
appeared inconsistent from one year to another. The control variables are problematic: 32% of the 
observations are missing, which led us to replace the missing observations with the average of precedent 
and subsequent years.  
This, and the quality of the dataset, invite to caution, and led us to test different models. We first 
considered two differences-in-differences models that exploited the five years of data3:  
(1) Yij = c + Pi + Yj + β1PBFij + εij   -which maximises the number of observations but does not include 
the three aforementioned control variables. It does include fixed effects for provinces and years.  
(2) Yij = c + Pi + Yj + β1PBFij + Cij + εij   -which also includes the three aforementioned controls (Cij) 
that are of disputable quality. 
Yij is the outcome variable (use of one of the aforementioned services). Pi and Yj are the fixed effects for 
years and provinces. PBF is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is a PBF programme in 
the province that year.  
As those models using many years could still suffer from inconsistent standard errors (Bertrand, 
Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004), a model that only included the years 2005 (pre-intervention) and 2009 (just 
before scaling up) was also tested, using the same covariates. 
Table 3 presents the situation in 2005, before the PBF projects started. When examining the main 
indicators and control variables, no statistical difference is detected at the 0.01 level between the group of 
ten provinces that eventually benefited from the PBF pilot provinces and the control group made of the 
seven provinces where the PBF was not rolled out before 2010. 
  
                                                                
2  The fact that until 2010 there existed a different Ministry for HIV/AIDS, different from the MoH, probably did 
not help making this information available in the Health Information System. 
3  The analysis was carried out using Stata (12 and 13). Dataset and do-file are available by the authors.   
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Table 3: Situation in 2005, before PBF started 
 
7 provinces 
without PBF until 2010  
10 provinces 
with PBF prior to 2010 
per 10,000 inhabitants / year mean sd  mean sd 
dependent variables      
outpatients (visits) 9083.38 (4436.62)  9204.59 (4353.62) 
antenatal consultations 181.81 (45.31)   141.37 (51.31) 
VAT vaccine 157.54 (63.83)   159.11 (59.32) 
postnatal consultations 36.47 (19.02)   33.16 (18.98) 
deliveries 73.29 (30.53)   64.03 (42.26) 
Perinatal mortality & stillbirths 0.03275 (0.01075)   0.03862 (0.01000) 
Polio vaccine 354.38 (30.28)   356.28 (75.21) 
BCG vaccine 423.40 (58.88)   411.10 (82.71) 
DPT vaccine 377.31 (53.63)   376.08 (75.04) 
MNR vaccine 349.21 (24.84)   376.63 (93.12) 
Intra-uterine device 21.22 (43.84)   5.12 (6.09) 
malaria (visits) not available not available   not available not available 
control variables      
public health facilities 0.6488 (0.2114)   0.7418 (0.2310) 
private health facilities 0.2560 (0.3584)   0.1393 (0.1720) 
qualified nurses 6.8197¹ (13.1980)   1.6771 (0.6691) 
Recorded state expenses (in BIF)² 897592 (803042)   915742 (514036) 
t-test difference between the two groups * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
¹ the 7 provinces without PBF include the capital city, Bujumbura, where the number of qualified nurse per 
inhabitant in much higher than in the rest of the country. 
² US$ 1 = BIF 1050 in 2005 
 
In a second part of the results section, we use a different dataset. It is independent from the health 
information system and was produced by Cordaid and the European Union that implemented PBF in 
seven provinces (Bubanza, Bururi, Makamba, Rutana, Ruyigi, Cankuzo, Karusi) located in West, South 
and East Burundi. The dataset covers the monthly provision of PBF-contracted services in 201 health 
centres and was primarily used to pay the health facilities. Its data were verified within the PBF system and 
are therefore supposedly more reliable than health information system data. Although this second dataset 
does not allow for comparison with control areas, it is useful in order to have a closer and second look at 
the variation of key indicators. 
3. Results 
Impact on the use of services 
Table 4 shows the results using the three models introduced in the last section: 
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Table 4: impact of PBF  
per 10,000 inhabitants 
model 1:  
2005-2009, no controls 
 
model 2: 
2005-2009, with controls 
 
model 3: 
2005 & 2009, with controls 
PBFa SE N  PBFa SE N  PBF
a SE N 
Outpatient 1383.7 1402.1 68  1216.8 1474.9 68  2186.7 2005.8 34 
Ante-natal visit 42.09* 24 85  34.55 24.75 85  71.53* 40.41 34 
ATV vaccination 97.26* 48.37 65  89.81* 46.12 65  106.6** 47.01 34 
Institutional delivery 35.84* 20.16 85  27.68 19.2 85  53.19 39.04 34 
Perinatal deaths/deliveriesb 0.0002 0.0021 85  0.0004 0.0021 85  -0.003 0.0045 34 
Vaccination of children  
Polio 11.89 12.73 85  10.3 13.48 85  10.57 25.24 34 
BCG 19.75 12.29 85  12.1 15 85  20.37 26.51 34 
DPT -0.204 14.9 85  -1.704 16.65 85  13.04 22.45 34 
MMR 44.41 26.9 85  40.35 26.48 85  38.18 28.35 34 
IUD 7.675 6.465 84  5.243 3.654 84  0.398 5.895 34 
Not PBF indicators 
Post-natal visit 31.06 28.88 82  30.08 31.53 82  20.36 49.46 33 
Malaria visit -6.9 20.07 51  -6.421 22.16 51  -44.78 54.3 17 
a PBF is the coefficient of the dummy variable PBF in the aforementioned models. SE is the standard error associated to this coefficiant.  P values: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
b (stillbirths + perinatal deaths within 7 days of delivery) / institutional deliveries  
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The coefficient of the PBF dummy is statistically significant for a p-value<0.1 and takes a positive 
sign for three out of twelve indicators in the model without control variables. PBF is positively associated 
with a significant increase in the completion of three pre-natal consultations, anti-tetanus vaccinations 
(ATV) for pregnant woman, and deliveries at the health centre. According to those results, and using the 
MoH/WHO formulas for measuring population targets4, PBF is associated with an increase of 20.3 
percentage points (pp) in ATV coverage, 7.4 pp in institutional deliveries at the health facility, and 8.9 pp 
in pre-natal consultations. The indicators on institutional deliveries and pre-natal consultations are only 
borderline significant (for p-value<0.1) when controlling for the number of public health facilities, private 
health facilities, and number of nurses per habitant. The indicator on ATV remains statistically significant 
but its value drops by 9%. Similarly, only ATV and pre-natal consultations remain statistically significant 
(for p-value<0.1) in the model that only considers the years 2005 and 2009. The coefficient of pre-natal 
consultations is not stable and increases by 40% in this last model.5 
No sound statistical relationship could be established between PBF and changes in number of outpatient 
visits, even when disaggregated between patients from the catchment area and from outside the catchment 
area. Postnatal visits, as well as perinatal deaths, vaccinations, IUD, and malaria treatments do not 
correlate with PBF either. The results for malaria must be considered carefully as the provinces where the 
PBF was not implemented are also of higher altitude and their inhabitants are notoriously less exposed 
than people living in the lowlands and the shores of Lake Tanganyika. 
The dataset also allows seeing what could be the impact of PBF on the nursing workforce. In post-conflict 
Burundi, PBF-supported provinces saw a larger increase in nurses per 10,000 inhabitants between 2005 
and the end of 2009 (increase of 197%) than non-PBF provinces (increase of 124%). This difference is 
statistically significant (two-tailed t-test: t: -1.7947, p-value: 0.092). Yet, it is also interesting to notice that 
the difference between the two groups fades away when extending the period to the end of the year 2010, 
the moment when PBF had been scaled up to the whole country.  
Evolution of key indicators in the pilot provinces 
Data from the PBF pilot projects reveal a general growth of key PBF indicators over the period 2006-
2011, particularly those related to curative and reproductive health. Table 6 shows the changes between 
the mean for the first twelve months6 of implementation of the PBF and the mean for year 2010 (table 5). 
Most indicators are clearly increasing over time but those related to the distribution of mosquito nets and 
vaccination of children. The number of visits (outpatient), which was not correlated with PBF in the 
                                                                
4  For all the indicators: 4.8% * population. 
 
6  Because of possible seasonal impacts and different starting dates for the different groups of provinces, we 
choose to use yearly averages.   
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previous sub-section, is only slightly higher in 2010 than in 2006. The figures for coverage take values 
higher than 100% for four out of seven indicators, which is abnormal and will be discussed. 
Table 5: Evolution of a series of key indicators in PBF area, relative to MoH/WHO targets 
 group¹ Change 
(% points) 
 12 first months  2010 
  mean sd  mean sd 
Outpatient 
(visits) 
1 8.27%  124.75% (79.09%)  133.02% (73.31%) 
2 12.42%**  81.82% (46.86%)  94.23% (96.30%) 
3 6.43%***  98.66% (61.19%)  105.10% (76.88%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
Full vaccination 
of children 
1 -19.54%***  117.41% (73.79%)  97.86% (64.58%) 
2 16.56%**  114.70% (88.09%)  131.25% (98.95%) 
3 -11.76%*  93.65% (152.39%)  81.89% (49.28%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
Deliveries 1 28.74%***  59.20% (45.36%)  87.94% (78.89%)  
2 18.12%***  55.89% (44.01%)  74.00% (68.47%)  
3 -5.24%  54.24% (38.14%)  49.00% (37.70%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
Ante-natal 
consultations 
1 57.09%***  59.11% (46.55%)  116.20% (58.20%) 
2 17.80%***  115.77% (57.24%)  133.58% (110.34%) 
3 5.56%***  73.91% (51.44%)  79.47% (51.27%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
IUD 1 36.29%***  57.21% (64.91%)  93.50% (125.73%)  
2 22.48%***  41.62% (73.54%)  64.10% (97.76%)  
3 36.34%***  38.58% (93.41%)  74.93% (140.00%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
ATV 1 19.77%***  90.43% (65.90%)  110.20% (90.86%)  
2 36.79%***  139.69% (159.91%)  176.49% (151.65%))  
3 15.45%***  73.30% (111.62%)  88.76% (103.57%)  
 
 
 
  
 
  
Malaria 
(distribution of 
mosquito nets) 
1 -32.08%***  92.91% (98.53%)  60.83% (58.47%) 
2 8.21%  57.13% (82.29%)  65.34% (68.35%) 
3 -17.48%  63.62% (405.89%)  46.14% (45.66%) 
t-test (two-tailed, paired) difference between the two periods * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
¹Group 1 (start 2006): Bubanza and Cankuzo provinces, Group 2 (start 2008): Rumonge district (Bururi province) 
and Nyanza-Lac district (Makamba province), Groupe 3 (start 2009): Bururi, Makamba, Karusi, Rutana and Ruyigi 
provinces. Last month available is July 2011 for all groups. 
 
The table also shows significant differences between the three generations of implementation of the PBF 
(health facilities that started in 2006, 2008, and 2009). However, the three groups have relatively similar 
growth patterns as shown with the cases of outpatient visits, children vaccination, IUD, and antenatal 
consultations in figure 1. The same figure also illustrates what seems to be an initial period of growth 
almost every time after PBF is introduced, before the indicators stabilise after a few months.  
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Interestingly, except in the case of antenatal care and outpatient visits, the growth of indicators is also 
associated with an increase in differences between health centres, which is reflected in standard deviations 
increasing over time. On a similar note, the widespread hypothesis that PBF leads to a redistribution of 
the workload from town-based health centres that were historically better equipped to more peripheral 
facilities that were poorly equipped could not be confirmed by the data. Taking the case of the growth in 
outpatient visits between the first twelve months of implementation of PBF and the last twelve months 
available, no sound statistical difference is found between the 34 health facilities located in places 
identified as towns and the rest (urban: +8.27%, rural: +15.2%; two-tailed t-test t: 0.893, p-value: 0.1864)7. 
4. Discussion  
It is necessary to acknowledge the small size of our sample and the average quality of the data we used. 
The impact evaluation is based on the statistical yearbooks of the HIS routine system, which were 
assembled in difficult context. There is however no obvious reason to believe that data collection was 
more, or less, efficient in PBF provinces compared to non-PBF ones8 and the results therefore probably 
give a first important indication about the impact of PBF on the use of services in Burundi, in the context 
of selective free health-care. The main issue with our dataset remains is its very small size and the fact that 
data is aggregated at the province-level, which gives quite limited statistical power and accuracy. The 
results are however relatively consistent with what Bonfer et al. found using both a different technique and 
a different dataset, even though the size of the effects is different. The results are also in line with Basinga 
et al. (2011)9 who worked on Rwanda and found an impact of PBF on institutional deliveries but not on 
children vaccinations and ante-natal care. Contrary to Basinga et al., but consistently with Bonfer et al., our 
study finds an impact of PBF on ante-natal care but not on post-natal care.  
In the second set of data we used, data are probably sounder as they were verified under the PBF scheme, 
but there remains a serious problem with the calculation of the target population, which leads to coverage 
figures well over 100%. This problem may affect not only the reporting of performances but also the 
comparison between facilities and provinces. It may be a technical problem caused by: (1) the formulas 
used to calculate the target populations that are inappropriate for Burundi10, and (2) issues with population 
figures (extrapolated from the 1990 and 2008 censuses) that led to both over- and under-estimations of 
the catchment populations, depending on the health facility11. 
                                                                
7  No covariates/controls were available to further this analysis. 
8  Health centres eventually became contracted to deliver complete monthly health data report but it was well after 
the strategy was scaled up to the entire country. 
institutional  
10  We found that the formulas seem to have been imported from Rwanda. They are neither in accordance with 
international standards nor the product of research conducted in Burundi.  
11  We find an average difference of 18% (in absolute value, standard deviation is 0.33 and 62% are over-
estimations) between the official population count based on the census and the data provided by an independent 
study conducted by a European Union project in 2011 in 6 provinces (Santé +, 2011). Using the independently 
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Despite these limitations, the above-mentioned probable increases in the use of some primary health-care 
services seem to be indeed linked to the introduction of PBF. This rests on the assumption that PBF 
intervention provinces were indeed randomly selected -in the sense that the implementation of the scheme 
was not dictated by the economic, political, or health situation of these provinces. On average, the PBF 
pilot provinces are not different from the ones of the control group in terms of wealth, health, 
governance, or experience of the civil war. Cordaid, HealthNet TPO, Swiss TPH and the Belgian 
Technical Cooperation intervened in the soon-to-be ‘PBF provinces’ according to the aid coordination 
framework agreed between the MoH and its partners, which divides the territory between the different 
partners, and their strategy happened to be PBF rather than input-based. Other partners were present in 
the other provinces, but did not choose the PBF strategy. Unfortunately, data about the funding levels of 
the interventions in non-PBF provinces has not been registered, which makes it complicated to assess the 
marginal return of the PBF strategy comparing to similar size input-based financing approaches. In other 
words, it is impossible to assess whether the impact of PBF we identified is mostly resource-driven or 
rests on the PBF mechanism itself (and the new incentives it introduces). Considering the PBF budgets, 
the main PBF implementer, Cordaid, which intervened in 7 out of 10 PBF pilot provinces, spent the 
equivalent of between Euro 1,100 and 2,000 per health facility per month –hospitals and health centres 
altogether and inclusive of all administration overheads, supervision, and verification costs12. 
It is also crucial to recall that the results are those of PBF in the context of selective free health care. Any 
impact could very well be due to the interaction between selective free health care and PBF, and not to 
PBF only. The size of this interaction effect is impossible to measure, but it is expected to be quite 
important, possibly even bigger than the impact of PBF itself. Indeed, several accounts confirm that PBF 
helped solving some of the issues with the implementation of the free health care policy, which include 
delays in the reimbursement of health facilities, overcharges, lower quality of care, and the lack of 
motivation of medical staffs (Bertone and Meessen, 2012). The fact that PBF seems related to an increase 
in the use of reproductive health services, which are free, but not of curative health services, which are 
mostly not free, is also a hint. Since financial barriers remain the main deterrent in accessing health care in 
Burundi (Republic of Burundi, 2010), it is possible that only when those barriers are removed is there 
room for other strategies for improving the use and quality of health-care services such as PBF. In the 
field, there are anecdotal evidence of PBF-supported health facilities taking initiatives to increase service 
provision (and being paid accordingly) such as opening delivery and patients’ rooms, extending opening 
hours, setting up night shifts, and purchasing small equipment. All could impact the use of reproductive 
health services in obvious ways. However, it seems that those initiatives for improving the quality of 
services have been limited to the health facility perimeter and health facilities have not significantly 
improved their community outreach capacities, which would have included the set-up of comprehensive 
                                                                
calculated set of population data in the paper instead of the official one did not change our results 
fundamentally. 
12  From Cordaid PBF projects audit reports. 2006-2010. 
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community health activities as part of an effective health promotion strategy (Marston et al., 2013). It 
would explain why PBF seems to have no impact on the use of preventive services. 
The results also help unpack a little bit of the ‘black box’ of the mechanisms and processes through which 
PBF may be linked to changes in services delivery (Ssengooba et al., 2012). The hypothesis of a change in 
the nursing workforce is confirmed, with PBF provinces attracting more qualified staff than control 
provinces. A survey conducted by the MoH, Cordaid, and the EU in 2010 in 6 provinces that benefited 
from PBF (Bururi, Cankuzo, Makamba, Karuzi Rutana and Ruyigi) helps further understand the situation 
of the nurses in PBF-supported health facilities. It shows (1) a significant increase of the proportion of 
qualified nurses in the staff working at peripheral health facilities, which increased from 37% of the staff 
in 2006 to 71% in 2010; (2) an increase in salaries and bonuses for qualified nurses, from approximately 
US$ 75 in 2006 to US$ 262 in 2011; and (3) a 5-fold increase in revenues of health facilities during the 
period 2006-2010 (Cordaid - Ministry of Health of Burundi, 2010). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
word about staff bonuses in PBF-supported health centres quickly spread across the country and created 
envy among medical staff stationed in non-PBF health facilities. The origin of the new nurses in PBF-
supported provinces is unfortunately unknown, and it is not possible to assess whether these new nurses 
have moved from other health centres or are fresh graduates. Our results also show that it seems possible 
to quickly restore the imbalance once the PBF strategy is scaled-up. Our dataset unfortunately lacks the 
statistical power to evaluate other hypotheses related to possible changes in PBF-supported facilities, in 
particular whether PBF leads to a redistribution of the workload between town-based and more peripheral 
health facilities. Similarly, our study only looks at the (reported) use of health services and does not assess 
changes in the health status of the population or in the quality of services. 
Although our results show that PBF in a selective free health-care environment could be an encouraging 
strategy for improving the use of reproductive health services in Burundi, key questions about this strategy 
and its implementation remain. The question of ‘gaming’, which has been well documented in high-
income contexts (Bevan and Hood, 2006), still needs to be further explored in the context of low-income 
countries. The increase in the workforce raises the question of the capacity of PBF to continue to 
stimulate health facilities in the long-run and the sustainability of the incentive mechanism (Cecchi and 
Duchoslav, 2014). There is also the question of the financial sustainability of PBF. PBF (in the health 
sector) is now a national priority for the Burundian government as shows its place in the new National 
Health Development Plan (2010-2015) and Strategic Plan for Poverty Reduction (2011-2015). In 2011, the 
government of Burundi –the tenth most aid dependant country in the world (in terms of aid/GNI ratio, 
World Bank, 2011)– contributed to 52% of the financing of the joint PBF and selective free health care 
system using its own (yet donor-dependant) budget. This contribution certainly is remarkable but is shows 
that the system remains fragile and aid-dependant; any breach or change in the funding system or in the 
politico-institutional situation of the country (van de Walle, 2005; Klingebiel and Janus, 2014) could have 
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far-reaching implications. Although most key officials within the MoH have been staunch supporters of 
PBF so far, the system remains largely conditioned by direct and indirect (budget support) aid. 
Conclusion 
Our study finds weak evidence that PBF contributed to the improvement of some indicators related to the 
use of reproductive health services in Burundi. These results leave some unanswered questions, which 
include the exact interaction effect of PBF and free health care policies, the impact of PBF on the quality 
of care, and the empirical evidence of its comparative advantage over similar size input-based approaches. 
The fact that the limited results cannot be attributed to PBF itself but to PBF in the context of free health-
care for children under 5 and pregnant women is an invitation to consider PBF as part of the larger health 
system (Meessen et al., 2011). As the lack of obvious PBF impact on indicators of the use of preventive 
and curative health-care services shows, PBF is not a magic bullet. To improve all services, it will be 
important to work on the articulation and synergies between PBF and the different strategies for 
improving the quality and accessibility to health-care such as for instance the exemptions of user fees, the 
quality and provision of drugs, health insurance, and the improvement of the nursing workforce. 
Finally PBF implementing agencies need to do a better job in making better and more tools available for 
thorough impact evaluations. To further advance our understanding of the impacts of PBF, especially as 
the PBF strategy expands in many sub-Saharan countries, it will be essential for projects and policy-makers 
to think about these tools, which could include the randomisation of the pilot PBF-supported health 
centres or simply the collection of ‘impact data’ alongside with ‘process data’, also in control areas, even 
before the implementation of projects. 
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